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Human Rights,
Civil Rights:
Prescribing
Disability
Discrimination
Prevention
in Packaging
Essential Health
Benefits
Anita Silvers and Leslie Francis

Health Care Insurance, Health Care, and
the Impact of Disability
Health care insurance schemes, whether private or
public, are notoriously unaccommodating to individuals with disabilities. While most nonelderly nondisabled persons in the U.S. are insured through private
sources, coverage sources for nonelderly persons with
disabilities have traditionally been a mix of private and
public coverage.1 For all age groups, the employmentto-population ratio is much lower for persons with a
disability than for those with no disability. Moreover,
employed persons with a disability were more likely
to be self-employed than those with no disability.2 As
a group, therefore, nonelderly people with disabilities
have not been as well positioned as others to obtain
private health care insurance because in the U.S.,
acquiring such coverage usually is employer based.
Private insurers have been wary of individuals with
disabilities because, according to the U.S. Office of
Disability, Aging and Long-Term Care Policy: “Health
care expenditures are expected to be higher for the
disabled than for the nondisabled, because of their
higher utilization rates. However, the mean expense
per event for all types of services available are also
higher for the disabled than for the nondisabled.”3
Both within and beyond the U.S., public health care
insurance programs are designed to include at least
some individuals with disabilities on their rolls.4 But
rarely, if ever, has the bare inclusion of disabled people
in such a public health care scheme been accompanied by a mandate to be responsive to their disabilities
in delineating the benefits to which participants are
offered access.5 Some non-U.S. nations’ public health
care rationing schemes have adopted prioritization
systems that explicitly devalue some patients with disabilities by presuming that their impairments depress
their quality of life.6
Once they are characterized as living less valuable
lives than nondisabled people do, disabled individuals may readily be denied kinds and levels of care customarily allocated without demurral to nondisabled
people, often on the ground that they cannot be made
functional, or kinds and levels of care ordinarily not
needed by nondisabled people, often on the ground
that it is too costly to make them functional.7
In the U.S., some public health care programs have
balked at offering to disabled individuals the kinds of
adaptive items they need to be restored to equitably
functional daily life. To illustrate, the Medicare manAnita Silvers, Ph.D., is a Professor of Philosophy and the
Philosophy Department Chair at San Francisco State University. Leslie Francis, Ph.D., J.D., is the Distinguished Alfred
C. Emery Professor of Law and Distinguished Professor of
Philosophy at the University of Utah.
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ual for power wheelchairs indicates that they are not a
covered benefit unless they are medically necessary for
use inside the home, thus confining people with significant mobility limitations to their homes just because
they can maneuver within the residence without powered mobility assistance.8 Funding for non-mobility-

When rights extend beyond protections from interference to the provision of goods such as health care
or education, critics predictably invoke the specter
of uncontrollable costs.12 Soon after the advent of
U.S. Medicare, Charles Fried13 argued that the right
to health care should be understood not as an equal

We explore whether an appropriate basis for effectively
banning such differential treatment as discrimination is an understanding
— like that motivating the 2007 United Nations Convention on the Rights
of People with Disabilities — that the highest attainable standard of health
is a human right. Or is there an alternative understanding of the basis for
protecting disabled people against inequities in access to health care services
that would prove preferable?
disabled individuals to repair mobility-damaging conditions, such as surgery and casting for fractured hips
and legs, and for some mobility-disabled individuals
to compensate for mobility-damaging conditions,
such as lower limb prostheses, do not carry the same
restriction, which is imposed to lower costs by making
wheelchair use as unpalatable as possible to those who
can walk the few steps needed within a home. And
U.S. private insurers often follow the public programs’
lead in determining the benefits they will provide.9
The problems extend beyond insurance to health
care offices and providers. A recent study indicated
that a significant percentage of U.S. subspecialty
physicians’ offices remain inaccessible, although the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has required
accessibility for almost 25 years.10 In the U.K., a 2007
report called attention to mistreatment in the NHS of
persons with learning disabilities. A report issued in
2013 indicated that the situation had not changed and
that between 2010 and 2012, 42% of the deaths in this
group of patients were premature and attributable to
poor health care and discriminatory attitudes within
the NHS.11
In this article, we explore whether an appropriate
basis for effectively banning such differential treatment as discrimination is an understanding — like
that motivating the 2007 United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD)
— that the highest attainable standard of health is a
human right. Or is there an alternative understanding of the basis for protecting disabled people against
inequities in access to health care services that would
prove preferable?
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right but as a right to a decent minimum because of
its costs. In what follows, we begin by explaining why
the understanding of health rights as human rights
in the CRPD could be problematic for delineating a
decent minimum that is equitable and inclusive for
people with disabilities. We then develop an alternative, non-metaphysical account of rights construed
not as human rights but as civil rights instantiated in
ongoing social agreements. We conclude by applying
this account to the right to health care under the U.S.
Affordable Care Act (ACA).

Health Care under the Convention on the
Rights of People with Disabilities
Coming into force in 2008, the CRPD is a human
rights instrument meant to delineate universal freedoms and protections that all disabled people deserve.
States parties to the CRPD commit to ensure that persons with disabilities are afforded full equality, including equal protection under the law. To date, 130 of the
155 signatory nations have ratified the CRPD; the U.S.
is a signatory, but the Senate has yet to give the consent required for ratification.
Article 25 of the CRPD recognizes persons with disabilities as possessing a “right to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of health without discrimination on the basis of disability.” Discrimination on
the basis of disability in the provision of health insurance is prohibited. Further, health insurance must be
made available to the disabled in a fair and reasonable
manner. States parties are to prevent discriminatory
denial of health care or health services or food and fluids on the basis of disability. Disabled people are to
be provided with the same range, quality, and stan-
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dard of free or affordable health care and programs
as provided to other persons, but also with health services they need specifically because of their disabilities. This latter provision entails that, due to disability,
utilization of basic packages of essential services may
be larger for some individuals than for others. It also
entails that basic packages must be constructed so as
not to exclude services essential for people with disabilities such as lower extremity prostheses or pharmaceuticals needed by patients with cystic fibrosis
or multiple sclerosis. Health care professionals are to
provide care of the same quality to persons with disabilities as to others; further, to apply health care services equitably to people with disabilities calls for their
free and informed consent.
Such equitable practice is to be accomplished
explicitly by raising awareness of the human rights,
dignity, autonomy, and needs of persons with disabilities through training and the promulgation of
ethical standards for public and private health care.
As with some of the other components of the CRPD,
the conceptualization of human rights here mixes
civil rights and social rights within a framework that
accords these rights to all humans just on the basis of
their being human.14 Thus, the CRPD pioneers aimed
to bring the aspirations of people with disabilities for
equality fully within the post-World War II movement
to expand global recognition of human rights. The
conceptual task is challenging, as the objective is to
defend differential distributive treatment as equitable
using ground that traditionally has rooted human
rights in the presumption that persons essentially
must be the same because all humans are persons and
only humans are persons.

Human Exceptionalism as a Basis for
Equitable Access to Health Care
The human rights frame initiated in European political discourse in the 16th century became fully endowed
with philosophical justifications during the 17th and
18th centuries and thereafter has inspired a multitude of emancipatory enterprises and movements.15
In contrast to earlier accounts of the protections and
privileges due humans from the state, which sorted
humans into different classes and ranked the groups
as to comparative worth, the traditional human rights
position is that all humans equally are owed freedom
from political or state-facilitated oppression.16 For the
human rights tradition, or at least for its older branch,
each human’s obligation to respect and protect other
humans derives from our all sharing the essential
properties of human nature.17 Human rights are universal rights, belonging to everyone in virtue of their
being human.18
human rights and disability • winter 2013

This “human exceptionalism” approach argues that
humans are distinguished from other animals in some
singular objective way.19 Each human has a claim on
recognition and respect from others because all alike
seek opportunity to realize their uniquely human value
in social interaction.20 But human exceptionalism
notoriously grants, as a corollary, permission to forgo
acknowledging individuals who do not seem to manifest the essential human characteristic as bearers of
rights. Thus, rights claims pertaining to biological individuals who might resemble humans in some — indeed,
in many or even most — respects are open to being
dismissed on ontological grounds by reference to their
lacking a crucial human-making property.21 So might
robots, however human their appearance and conduct,
be denied rights; since Isaac Asimov’s I, Robot,22 the
matter of whether machines and animals have human
liberty rights has been a central post-WWII science fiction theme.23 And so have individuals with disabilities
been denied the status of rights bearers.
Two different components of human nature have
been invoked as the proper basis for acknowledging
human rights. One kind of property is a broadly construed psychological or mental property. The other is
a broadly construed biological or material property.24
The argument for human rights based on distinctively human mental properties usually unfolds thus:
a crucial cognitive or other kind of mental capacity is asserted to differentiate humans from other
species. For example, Michael Tooley25 argued that
“[a]n organism possesses a serious right to life only
if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing
subject of experiences and other mental states, and
believes that it is itself such a continuing entity.” A
further step equates distinctively human psychological capacity with the capacity for rational conduct, and
especially for formulating aims for action through selfreflection.26 This singular characteristic that makes
humans unique also is supposed to be the source of
our fundamental value to ourselves and to each other.
Each human therefore should respect the capacity of
adult humans to execute the requisite kind of rational
action, and to accept self-reflective responsibility for
what has been done. But exercising our exceptional
capacities requires being sufficiently self-governing,
and free from social and political subordination, to
self-determine the good for one’s self.27
Thus, from a mental difference that purportedly
makes humans exceptional has been drawn a warrant
for acknowledging and attributing human rights. Placing human rights on this basis, however, precludes the
possibility that human rights can be universal in the
requisite sense. Disabled people commonly have been
perceived as failing to meet the standard of capacity
783
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for self-reflective (and thereby responsible) action.28
Consequently, individuals who are biologically human
but are perceived as lacking the crucial level of cognitive capacity have been denied the usual freedom,
and moral and legal protections, that human rights
are expected to bestow. The metaphysical move of
grounding rights in essential human properties thus
has enabled exclusion from, rather than inclusion
under, rights-bearers’ protection.
There is, further, an infamous history of underestimating the capacities of individuals, based on their
disabilities. For centuries, hearing-impaired people
were mistakenly assessed as intellectually impaired,
just because they did not speak what they thought.29
The centuries of denying schooling to intellectually
disabled people, as well as to people with other kinds
of disabilities, and then condemning them as unable
to learn because they lacked reading and writing
skills other people acquired through schooling, also
illustrate the effect of bias on accurate assessment of
disabled people’s capacity.30 In general, non-verbal
individuals, and other individuals whose disabilities
impede communication, remain vulnerable to misjudgment of this kind. The impact of such bias against
failing to display the species-definitive mental capacity set as the standard for being human is that biologically human individuals with disabilities have been
regarded as not being really human or fully human
persons with the same entitlements as other people.
This pretext has regularly motivated excluding
disabled people from the ranks of rights bearers. As
a result, in many legal systems individuals with disabilities have been bereft of legal standing and thereby
deprived of equal protection from the law. Article 12 of
the CRPD attempts a remedy, adjuring states parties
to reaffirm the right of people with disabilities to be
recognized as full persons and to enjoy legal capacity
on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life. But
the components of Article 12 that direct states parties
to provide for effective safeguards to prevent abuse,
coercion, exploitation, and arbitrary or excessive confinement, and of Article 13 that call for ensuring effective access to justice for persons with disabilities on an
equal basis with others, indicate the enormous amount
of justice system reform through which nations must
go to achieve justice for all, including disabled people.
Human rights are supposed to be universal, but the
adduced essential human-making properties are not
co-extensive with the class of individuals who in other
circumstances are taken to be humans. Contrary to
human rights programs’ mandate to promote equality, this strategy does not escape sorting individuals,
based on non-disability or disability, into classes of
higher and lower status, with the former more socially
784

privileged and better protected than the latter. That
affirmation of full legal standing to invoke rights has
been so hard for disabled people to attain suggests the
hazards of invoking a species-definitive psychological
or mental capacity in validating human rights.
If special intellectual capacity is not the hallmark,
perhaps the universality of human rights lies in the
other familiar articulation of human exceptionalism,
which is the claim that humans are all equally products of a special and singularly successful biological
evolutionary process.31 The idea here is that humans
are naturally constructed to be concerned about ourselves, and for those we believe to be our close biological kin as well. We biologically bond with kin to
care for our offspring, and we naturally also ally with
the smaller and larger circles of humans on whom our
own welfare and our family’s welfare depend.
Biological exceptionalism also lends itself to privileging some humans and marginalizing or excluding
others. If kinship is supposed to be the basis of each
human’s duty to acknowledge human rights of others,
some individuals will enjoy a more secure status than
others, depending on how broadly their family resemblances reach. Far from being an expansive basis for
human rights, biological exceptionalism seems to
energize a kind of tribalism that might embrace close
family members who happen to have disabilities, but
by no means extends to most disabled people, who
remain anonymous anomalous individuals distanced
and treated as alien because of their disabilities.
Another reason for concern about the power of inclusiveness offered by a “family ties” basis for universal
human rights emerges from the muted or absent family responses to the disappearance of their disabled
relatives during the Nazi euthanasia program years.32
Sourcing a health care right in individuals’ humanity, when this status is assigned on the basis of kinship bonds, also threatens to strain the health care
system. In this circumstance, the most pressing and
effectively presented claims for care will come from
family advocates for whom the patient is supremely
human and thereby deserving of the full array of care
that medicine can offer. The troubled and sometimes
ruinous process whereby families of disabled children
are expected to advocate extensively so as to obtain
special educational services should serve as a warning here. Better-educated families in more favorable
economic condition have proven more successful than
less fortunate ones in obtaining services, and individuals with disabilities bereft of favorable family support
may have no one advocating for them at all.33
Disparities of social status, which track appearance of functional deficit but do not take into account
the adaptive functionality achievable with access to
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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effective services, can create unnecessary problems in
assembling an essential health care benefits package.
Bias that promotes normal appearance or conduct, or
family resemblance, as important for preferable status
and privilege, while anomalous function or presence
has the opposite result, places a premium on providing medical procedures that aim at normality rather
than adaptive functionality. Individuals are best situated to claim such rights when their appearances
and conduct most resemble the species’ paradigm, or
else they look and act as their family or community
group expects, but rights with warrants contingent on
such family ties fall short of the universality to which
human rights aspire.34
Although some human rights theorists believe this
human exceptionalist basis of rights affords dignity and
therefore rights-bearer status without being defeasible

Collective Agreement as a Basis for
Equitable Access to Health Care
To summarize so far, human exceptionalism is a traditional, and perhaps the prevailing, approach to
grounding human rights, one with roots that predate
the Enlightenment and one that remains strong today.
But theories about an exceptional human psychological capacity for logical or reflective thinking, or an
exceptional human biological capacity for personal
attachment, both turn too easily into rationales for
excluding at least some disabled humans from human
rights protection by portraying them as so lacking in
crucial, and exclusively human, dignity-conferring
properties that they fail to qualify as rights-bearers.37
And in regard to individuals whose disabilities do not
debar them from the usual ontology of the human
species or humankind, a traditional human rights

Justice is constructed through building trust relationships that are inclusive
of outliers. Thus, justice should be understood always as a work in progress.
We should not suppose, despite ideal justice theorizing pressing
us to do so, that fully inclusive and therefore universal justice can
be a fait accompli. Rights claims are no exceptions.
due to disability,35 there are both historical and logical reasons for being skeptical of this claim. To invoke
uniquely human properties as the basis of human rights
is to place a premium on the disabled’s similarity or family resemblance to species-typical or normal humans.
In the circumstances created by grounding policy in
human exceptionalism, therefore, equitable essential health care packages ought to cover interventions
meant to make patients seem more normal, whether or
not they make the individual more functional.
In such circumstances, we should expect a human
right to health care to be invoked in demands for
health care interventions aimed at enabling the patient
to appear less unusual or to seem normal. Health care
packages thus would need to be designed with normality as the touchstone. Likely results could be, on
the one hand, reluctance to cover services needed to
attain functionality if supposed normality cannot be
fully achieved, but, on the other hand, consumption of
resources and courting of risks just to gain the appearance of or to approximate normality, even if reduced
functionality results from such medical treatment.36
So this recipe, called for by the standard for being
treated as human that exceptionalism sets, appears to
drive misguided, but also unnecessarily costly, health
care interventions.
human rights and disability • winter 2013

approach lacks theoretical resources to respond to
those who are concerned that rights will become costly
demands for services that are less about functionality
than about the appearance of normality.
An alternative approach to rights rejects metaphysical beliefs about essential humanizing properties and
instead understands rights as tools that both emerge
from and enable the kinds of human interactions that
shape our social environment. We humans are, individually as well as collectively, both creators of our own
political and cultural values yet also creatures of the
liberating or constricting political and cultural conditions we create. It follows that we humans possess
individual and collective powers to narrow or expand
who can be considered the parties included in such
tacit cooperative agreements, as well as to regulate
the repertoire of roles made available to facilitate different people’s inclusion. As Rousseau observed, our
frailty is a main characteristic that we humans have in
common.38 What approach to avoiding disability bias
in delineation of essential health care benefits might
be developed by invoking such non-metaphysical
grounds for rights?
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Tacit Agreement and Rights as Civil Rights
On a pragmatist view, what political morality requires
is evolving and context-dependent. Humans live and
interact in communities, developing, shaping, testing, and reshaping norms by which to live together. As
Ruth Anna Putnam39 points out, “Unlike other social
animals, we are able to reflect on the ways in which we
cooperate and on the effects of the manner of our association on ourselves and others.” As we have argued,40
justice is constructed through building trust relationships that are inclusive of outliers. Thus, as we also
have argued, justice should be understood always as
a work in progress.41 We should not suppose, despite
ideal justice theorizing pressing us to do so, that fully
inclusive and therefore universal justice can be a fait
accompli.
Rights claims are no exceptions. Political rights are
the original core of the civil rights and international
rights movements.42 Made within political institutions, both national and international,43 their function
is to press political institutions to recognize what is
necessary for each of their members to lead flourishing lives within them, hence their acknowledgement
of universal aspiration. Understood pragmatically,
rights are instruments for expanding equality among
different kinds of individuals who happen to be
interacting with one another. Thus, their expression
resists schemes that appoint some individuals as more
deserving of flourishing than others. This expansive
drive emerges from the nature of such rights, which
is to protect individuals’ interactions by promoting
respect equally for the integrity of all who have occasion to engage. As such, rights claims both reflect and
challenge social arrangements. They both accept and
question resource constraints, building on what exists
in the continuing effort to create conditions under
which all flourish because each can flourish. From a
practical political organizing perspective, calls for civil
rights engagement are familiar inspiration for such
progressive pragmatic efforts.
Within this context, rights are claims on the social
resources needed to meet basic interests that are critical to individuals’ interactive flourishing. For what
have been termed “negative” rights — i.e., rights to
non-interference — these are the institutions that
protect physical security, freedom from torture and
slavery, liberty of thought and expression, privacy,
freedom of movement, and the like.44 They are the
political rights of assembly and participation.45 For
what have been termed “positive” rights — i.e., rights
to specified resources — these are means by which to
meet critical human needs: food, shelter, health care,
education, employment, and the like.46
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Our contention here is that these rights should be
understood in a pragmatist rather than a metaphysical framework, grounded explicitly in acknowledgement of people’s differences rather than rooted in
claims about how humans essentially are the same.
How rights are instantiated specifically in a given
social context depends on the normative understandings in place at that time. These tacit understandings
are not static, however; they are continually pressed to
develop possibilities of flourishing for all.
Rights to health care can be understood purely
as civil rights in this way. Existing assumptions and
resources are the start. But their inclusiveness is subject to ongoing challenge in terms of whether they
allow everyone equally to lead flourishing lives in
accord with their conceptions of their good.47 This
may cost more for some than for others; the point
is that each should have meaningful access to the
benefits that health care can provide to them in the
context in which they live. In what follows, we apply
this approach — existing assumptions and resources
tested against a meaningful access standard to health
care in a manner that respects all — to the ACA and
the cost pressures on it. Similar points could be made
about cost pressures on the public health systems in
place in most other advanced industrial countries.

ACA: Existing Assumptions
The ACA of 2010 was developed in a context in which
approximately 45 million lawful U.S. residents were
estimated to lack health insurance and many more
had coverage inadequate to their needs. Those with
insurance derived their coverage primarily from their
employers, from the Medicaid federal-state partnership that provides coverage for the poor falling into
designated categories, and from the Medicare program for the elderly and those with long-lasting disabilities. All of these programs were undergoing serious financial strain. Employer-provided insurance
was contracting in the numbers of employers offering
coverage, in the coverage provided, and in the extent
to which costs were passed on to persons with insurance. The ACA aimed both to expand coverage and to
stem the tidal wave of coverage reductions.
The ACA also sought to move beyond limitations in
anti-discrimination. In the private market, the ADA
Title I provided the only bulwark against disability
discrimination in employer-provided insurance. Title
I permits employer-provided plans to design benefits
or charge rates based on underwriting judgments that
are consistent with state law, so long as these are not
a subterfuge for discrimination48 — thus permitting
significant differences in coverage and costs based on
types of health needs. For plans purchased by individjournal of law, medicine & ethics
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uals on their own, ADA Title III, the public accommodations title, provided protection in accessing the
offices in which insurance is sold but not the products
available therein.49 The ACA sets out to remedy these
deficiencies in several ways. Large employers (with
over 50 employees) must offer affordable coverage of a
core set of benefits or pay penalties. Smaller employers
and employees who do not have access to employerprovided coverage are to be able to purchase coverage
through exchanges created in each state; plans sold
through the exchanges must cover essential benefits.
Other anti-discrimination protections applied
to public services, including Medicare and Medicaid. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provided that
“[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability
in the United States…shall, solely by reason of her or
his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United
States Postal Service.”50 Subsequently, ADA Title II,
the public services title, adopted the same language
to cover public services,51 and the two statutes have
been interpreted in tandem. In a critical 1985 decision
under the Rehabilitation Act, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that it is a denial of benefits to fail to provide
individuals with meaningful access to the benefits in
question.52
Alexander v. Choate involved Tennessee’s decision
to limit Medicaid’s inpatient hospital benefit to 14
days in any given year. Although it has been viewed
as implying that financially motivated state Medicaid
cutbacks are within the discretion of states and are not
disability discrimination, this is not what the decision
actually holds.53 In the decision, the Court adopted
the standard that persons with disabilities must have
meaningful access to federally funded programs or
to public services. However, the Court also held that
the plaintiffs had not shown that Tennessee failed to
meet this standard. Although the plaintiffs had shown
that some patients had been discharged earlier than
their physicians recommended or had not been able
to receive certain types of care within the limit, they
had not shown that these limits functioned to deny
meaningful access to health care persons with disabilities in particular. The meaningful access standard
has been used in a wide variety of subsequent decisions involving public services other than health care
— but the misinterpretation that Alexander v. Choate
gives states wide discretion in cutting health benefits
remains. With this backdrop, limited effort has been
devoted to developing an understanding of meaning-
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ful access to health care for people with disabilities,
along with everyone else.
The ACA was aimed to stem the receding tide
of private health insurance by providing access for
individuals and small businesses to affordable coverage of essential benefits. It also was meant to expand
coverage of public programs to everyone below 138%
of poverty. The objective was to provide a minimum
national floor of health care for everyone. What this
means in regard to providing disabled people with the
opportunity to obtain equitable health care will need
to be informed by a conceptualization of meaningful
access on equal terms for all.

ACA as a Civil Right: Meaningful Access
on Equal Terms for All
The ACA has been promoted to disabled people as a
cure for the disadvantage they typically have had to
endure in both seeking and utilizing health care coverage. Healthcare.gov,54 a federal website managed by
the Department of Health and Human Services, tells
disabled people:
If you’re living with a disability, private health
insurance may be hard to come by. Even if you
can afford to buy it, it probably doesn’t cover
all of your needs. Worrying about where to get
coverage and the cost of your care is the last
thing you want to do. The Affordable Care Act is
expanding your options for health insurance and
making them more affordable.
Much of the website’s text describing options, however, focuses on elimination of pre-existing condition
requirements, provision of preventive care to avoid
disabling conditions (presumably to reduce the size of
the group the message needs to reach), and proscription in some cases of a cap on lifetime benefits. Absent
is reassurance of what actual benefits may be, other
than abstract reference to mandating an essential
benefits package covering a very generally specified
collection of services.
Moreover, dire predictions about cost pressures
sound a continuing drumbeat. There seems to be
general agreement that health care costs have to be
brought down, but also that more people must be
served. In this regard, it will be attractive to suppose
that the least costly approach is to tailor services to
the needs of typical patients, even though doing so
may make health care more expensive or unavailable
for atypical ones. Such thinking cannot help but invite
imposing disparately disadvantageous burdens of cost
for health care and access to health care on individuals with disabilities. For these reasons, whether the
787
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ACA improves health for disabled people by improving their access to health care will to a great extent be
decided by how essential benefits are defined.
In principle, the ACA alters the U.S. health care
picture by opening the opportunity to be insured for
health care to everyone alike. In doing so, however,
the ACA also opens questions about how to avoid
disability-based discrimination in providing for the
potential health services needs of individuals who
vary dramatically in their health states, and especially
of individuals who may incur higher expenses for one
or more reasons relating to their disabilities. We highlight several areas of particular concern here, showing
how the understanding of rights as civil rights applies
to them: defining essential benefits for coverage sold
through exchanges, making possible changes in the
Medicaid program, and permitting plans to charge
more for individuals who do not meet specified wellness targets.
The services that constitute essential health benefits for insurance plans offered through exchanges fall
into ten categories. Some of these — such as mental
health services, rehabilitative and habilitative services
and devices, and chronic disease management — are
of special importance to people with disabilities. The
degree to which each disabled person in the U.S. can
be functional and independent will be affected by how
austere, or generous, the minimal provision of services
in these categories will have to be. The character of the
minimum will constrain not only those disabled people who have the barest permissible coverage for such
services, but also more affluent disabled individuals
who can afford to purchase higher end coverage and
to make supplementary non-reimbursed purchases of
equipment and treatments as well.
For example, the quality of rehabilitation services
and assistive equipment that is available for purchase
is constrained by what insurance will pay, even for
private purchasers, because insurance programs constitute the largest market. What is covered by “rehabilitative and habilitative” services may make an enormous difference in regard to access by people with
disabilities. If rehabilitative services do not include
services needed to maintain function, but only include
services that increase function — as is the case for
many plans, including Medicare, today, patients with
incurable disabling conditions may find their access
to the repertoire of physical, psychological, and occupational therapeutic services to be greatly inferior to
that of patients for whom normal functioning can be
restored. Further, for other services, such as hospitalization and maternity services, disabled people often
may need more extensive or different services than
nondisabled people typically do. Emphasizing the
788

expense of services — e.g., the U.S. decision to impose
a tax on so-called “Cadillac” high premium plans—
puts the question exactly backwards by construal in
terms of what can be fitted within cost constraints.55
Indeed, one recent analysis indicates that taxing based
on premium costs, rather than examining how variations in such matters as salaries or regional differences
in utilization affect plan costs, risks reducing needed
services.56 Rather, the question should be what is
required for functioning on equal terms and how this
can best be achieved.
The original idea of ACA was that the essential
benefits required of plans sold through exchanges
would be uniform nationally. That way, people would
not find themselves consigned to limits by the arbitrary accident of geography. However, beyond the
categories required in the statute, the idea of uniform essential benefits has proved difficult to apply.
Instead, benchmark plans have been selected for each
state, reflecting the type of coverage available in that
location. The result is considerable flexibility in what
essential benefits might require, especially for items
such as durable medical equipment or home health
care that may be especially important to people with
disabilities.57 If available plans fall short in providing
meaningful access to groups of people such as those
with mobility impairments, however, they will be subject to challenge under the civil rights view we have
developed above.
Other risks are persistent limits in Medicaid, the
U.S. safety net program providing health insurance
for eligible categories of people in poverty. U.S. states
are not required to have Medicaid; before the ACA, all
states participated in the program but many offered
only the minimum requirements for pregnant women,
children, the elderly, people in certain categories of
disability, and others who were made eligible by falling into specified categories. Excluded were many
adults, including people with disabilities not falling
into the specified categories or over the maximum
limits on income and assets but unable to purchase
insurance through the private market. A goal of the
ACA was expanding Medicaid to cover these people at
least up to those with incomes of 138% of poverty. The
U.S. Supreme Court, however, determined that this
required expansion trammeled on the role of states
in the federalist system. Many states are balking at
expanding Medicaid coverage, thus leaving people in
those groups still without likely access to health insurance. Moreover, a few states are trying to bargain with
the federal government to let them use Medicaid program money to buy exchange coverage; states such as
Ohio and Florida have sought additional concessions
that they will not need to cover services included in
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Medicaid if the services are not included in the state
benchmark plan. The federal government has resisted
these bargaining efforts, making it likely that these
states will join the states not expanding Medicaid. In
all of these states, many individuals in poverty or nearpoverty, some with disabilities, will not have access to
health care at all except on a charity or emergency
basis, thus perforce, not having meaningful access to
these benefits. Even those with Medicaid may not have

of the disability category and thus signaled intent
to provide protection against disability-based discrimination in a fairly broad way, there is little indication of how this approach would play out in the
complex context of disparate impact of disability on
health insurance premiums. Especially difficult will
be determination of whether different treatment was
on the basis of disability or for other non-discriminatory reasons. Therefore, it will be critical to pro-

We have argued that the understanding of health care as a human right, as
found in the CRPD, fails to provide the theoretical machinery for responding
to the pressing challenges of health care costs. These challenges are real and
potentially devastating. We develop instead an account of health care as a civil
right. What this right requires is dependent on the context and resources of
the time, so long as all have meaningful access to the benefits provided.
meaningful access to health benefits on the terms of
others in society, given likely cutbacks imposed to save
money. For example, Louisiana has announced cuts
in hospice services and psychiatric care for Medicaid
patients.58
Also of concern are premium variations for persons not meeting specified wellness targets. Coverage
sold through exchanges must not exclude pre-existing
conditions and premiums must be community rated.
However, there may be significant variations in premiums for failure to reach wellness targets. There are
exceptions for people whose physicians certify they
cannot meet targets or meeting the target would not
be medically advised.
How this permission to increase premiums for individuals who fail to meet targets will be applied to people with disabilities is unclear.59 The ACA prohibits
discrimination based on health status.60 However, the
ACA also makes it clear that the premium difference
is not discrimination based on health status. It is not
unheard of to place responsibility for having physical
or mental deficits, or for failing to overcome these, on
the disabled. It may be difficult to prevent insurance
companies, whose interests lie with deflecting responsibility onto the insured, from delineating as straitened a space as law and public sentiment will allow
for unavoidable absence of wellness.
The prospect here is for a replay of the avalanche,
encountered during the first two decades of the ADA,
of successful defenses against charges of disability
discrimination based on narrowing the definition
of disability. Even though Congress subsequently
amended the ADA to block excessive constriction
human rights and disability • winter 2013

vide that exceptions for those whose disabilities prevent them from participating in standard wellness
programs be readily available without reproducing
the familiar adversarial processes required by other
programs for persons to prove disability. Otherwise,
on this basis as well, implementation of the ACA will
violate the civil right to health care as understood in
this discussion.

Conclusion
The promise of health care as a right has all too often
proved hollow for people with disabilities. In this article, we have argued that the understanding of health
care as a human right, as found in the CRPD, fails to
provide the theoretical machinery for responding to
the pressing challenges of health care costs. These
challenges are real and potentially devastating. We
develop instead an account of health care as a civil
right. What this right requires is dependent on the
context and resources of the time, so long as all have
meaningful access to the benefits provided. The ACA
includes some provisions that may prove antithetical
to this nondiscrimination standard.
In the circumstances created by grounding policy in
human exceptionalism, the conclusion to be drawn is
that equitable essential health care packages ought to
cover interventions meant to make individuals seem
more normal, whether or not they make the patient
more functional. To invoke uniquely human properties
as the basis of human rights is to place a premium on
the disabled’s similarity to species-typical or normal
humans. Instead, the driving rights-based challenge
to existing arrangements with respect to health care
789
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should be the extent to which these arrangements provide each on equal terms with the health care needed
to lead flourishing lives.
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